To send material to Cryptome "anonymously":
- Consider that the odds are very high that Cryptome or any other disclosure initiative (anonymizer, leak site, paste, doc-drop, torrent) is a deception operation, witting or unwitting, and avoid their use.
- Protect yourself and never trust any method proposed by a receiver of your material. Never believe assurances of privacy and security for it is customary to deceive about them, witting or unwitting, and inevitable failures are never fully admitted.
- Presume there are no secure means to anonymously transmit online due to the basic design of the Internet to minutely track transmitted data despite illusory promises of anonymizing, cloaking and hiding services.
- Presume undisclosed sysadmin surveillance throughout the online transmittal path.
- Presume there are no fully secure means to encrypt digital material due to the unbridgeable gap between programming limitations of digital data and the engineering indequacies of analog devices to handle it.
- Presume every program, device and system has a traceable embedded unique ID or electromagnetic performance signature.
- If a host is used, run a series of test submssions of provocative but benign material to see what happens. Place "dye markers" in the material to trace its movement. Expect tampering, ruse, subterfuge, false assurance.
- "Not traceable to you," repeated below, is the hardest part only you can do.
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